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Involuntary job loss in administrative data is commonly identified by focusing on mass-
layoffs or plant closures. However, such events usually do not happen without prior 
knowledge, which potentially leads to selection in the labor turnover of distressed firms. We 
find that workers separating from closing plants up to 2 quarters before closure are associated 
with significantly lower displacement costs and on average significantly higher pre-closure 
earnings levels as opposed to ultimately displaced workers. Furthermore, our results indicate 
that displaced workers with high pre-closure earnings experience significantly lower 
reductions in future employment probabilities. These findings suggest that compositional 
differences cause estimated displacement costs to differ between early leavers and ultimately 
displaced workers. Focusing exclusively on the latter group would lead to a serious 
overestimation of displacement costs. 
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Displaced workers have been the subject of an extensive literature.1 Intro-
duced in the seminal paper by Jacobson et al. (1993), the standard speci¯-
cation to measure the e®ect of displacement is borrowed from the evaluation
literature: the labor market performance of displaced workers (treatment
group) is compared to the one of non-displaced workers (control group).
Typically, this type of analysis requires administrative data, as long-term
earnings and employment information must be available for displaced as well
as non-displaced workers. A well-known challenge in these studies is the
identi¯cation of involuntary job separations. The most popular strategy to
overcome this di±culty is to focus on displacement-generating events such
as mass-layo®s or plant closures (the limit case of a mass-layo®). Separa-
tions observed at the moment of such events are assumed to be the result of
an exogenous shock and, therefore, independent of a worker's quality. Thus
displaced workers should be a random sample of the workforce.
However, as plant closures typically do not happen as a complete sur-
prise to either management or workers2, it seems realistic to assume that
the ultimate shutdown of an establishment is preceded by a period in which
both workers and management have time to react strategically. Knowledge of
future distress will in°uence both ¯rms' ¯ring- as well as workers' quitting-
decisions. The ¯rm might choose to retain its most productive workers3,
while workers with relatively better labor market opportunities might choose
to avoid displacement and quit before closure. As a consequence of this se-
lection process the average cost of separation might also vary relative to the
closure of a plant. However, as presumably both mechanisms, \workers leav-
ing the sinking ship" and \the management throwing ballast overboard", are
1See Kletzer (1998), Fallick (1996) and Farber (1999) for reviews of the literature on
displaced workers.
2Advance notice legislation is the most obvious reason why information on impend-
ing lay-o®s becomes available beforehand. See Addison and Portugal (1987), Jones and
Kuhn (1995) and Ruhm (1994) for studies that investigate the e®ects of advance notice
regulations.
3Several studies such as Farber and Gibbons (1996), Felli and Harris (1996) and Altonji
and Pierret (2001) show that learning about workers' abilities occurs and that it in°uences
the ¯rm's employment decisions.
1at work simultaneously4, post-separation outcomes of early leavers might on
average be better, equal or worse compared to post-separation outcomes of
ultimately displaced workers.
In this study we investigate the labor turnover process in closing plants as
well as di®erences in post-separation outcomes based on matched employer-
employee data for the universe of Austrian workers. In particular, we test
empirically three key propositions linked to the selection hypothesis in the
labor turnover process before plant closure. Firstly, we investigate whether
post-separation outcomes di®er signi¯cantly between early leavers and ulti-
mately displaced workers. Secondly, if the selection hypothesis is correct,
the group of early leavers might be associated with a di®erent level of av-
erage productivity compared to ultimately displaced workers. We test this
proposition by means of estimating pre-closure earnings regressions. Finally,
we investigate the relationship between pre-closure earnings and the e®ect
of displacement in order to understand whether di®erences between early
leavers and ultimately displaced workers in terms of pre-closure earnings can
explain di®erences in post-separation outcomes.5
Although the literature on displaced workers is vast, few studies have so
far empirically examined the labor turnover process in dying establishments.
One recent paper analyzing changes in the composition of worker °ows prior
to displacement is that of Pfann and Hamermesh (2001). This study tests a
model of two-sided learning using personnel data from Fokker Aircraft that
cover the paths of layo®s and voluntary quitting through its bankruptcy.
The basic idea of the model is, that parties to an employment relationship
may learn about each other's intentions about ending the relationship by
forming expectations based on the other party's prior behavior that ended
similar relationships. Empirically Pfann and Hamermesh (2001) ¯nd that
4For previous evidence on this, see Pfann and Hamermesh (2001) and Lengermann and
Vilhuber (2002).
5One should note that this study places itself in the tradition of papers, which take the
plant closure itself as a given. A small distinct literature explicitly investigates the link
between movements of workers and the causes of plant closure and downsizing (See Abowd
et al. (2005) and Carneiro and Portugal (2003)). However, while this issue is not directly
addressed here, the results of this study emphasize its importance and also provide \food
for thought" for researchers working on this topic.
2learning does occur. In particular, they ¯nd that workers with a lower ¯r-
ing probability during the closure process have longer job tenure, are males,
have higher educational attainment, have technical/vocational schooling, are
married, have taken more internal and external training courses and have a
higher job evaluation. On the other hand, workers with lower quit propen-
sities are between 35 and 50 years old, have longer tenure and are less well
educated. In another paper, Lengermann and Vilhuber (2002) extend the
signalling-model of Gibbons and Katz (1991) by introducing the idea that
better workers may seek to avoid being viewed as being of average qual-
ity by leaving the ¯rm prior to displacement, while those of lesser quality
have an incentive to wait until displacement occurs. Using unemployment
insurance records for the state of Maryland and proxying for worker qual-
ity by employing a measure derived from individual ¯xed e®ects stemming
from wage regressions,6 they ¯nd evidence for high-skilled workers leaving as
well as ¯rms laying o® low skilled workers in periods before displacement.
Bowlus and Vilhuber (2002), in another study, test the implications of a par-
tial equilibrium search model with notice on impending displacement. Using
data from US universal wage records, they ¯nd evidence that workers leaving
a distressed ¯rm before a mass-layo® have higher re-employment wages as
opposed to ultimately displaced workers.
These ¯ndings foster the concern that focusing on the ultimately dis-
placed workers might lead to biased estimates of the e®ect of displacement.
A concern that, however, has been long recognized by the displacement liter-
ature. The standard approach to overcome this potential problem is usually
to include all separations happening within a certain time window before the
displacement generating event.7 A strategy that faces the trade-o® between
neglecting early leavers and including a considerable amount of normal work-
force turnover. While the choice of a time window has been quite ad-hoc in
previous studies, we go beyond the existing literature by providing a rationale
6Following the technique pioneered by Abowd et al. (1999).
7Jacobson et al. (1993) focused on separators whose ¯rms' employment in the year
following their departure was more than 30% below their max in the 1970's. Bender et al.
(2002) choose a rigid time window of two years before plant closure. Eliason and Storrie
(2004) introduce a °exible time window, that varies with plantsize, of up to three years.
3for the choice of a particular window. The key assumption that guides us
in this exercise is that post-separation outcomes should be indistinguishable
between separations from closing plants and separations from non-closing
plants if observed separations in closing plants are completely unrelated to
the upcoming shut-down of the establishment. Applying this selection cri-
terion reveals that only separations up to 2 quarters before closure should
unequivocally be regarded as early leavers.
Moreover, we exploit the size of our available data set to increase the
comparability between displaced and non-displaced workers by employing
an exact-matching selection algorithm for adequate control subjects. We
then extend the standard speci¯cation of Jacobson et al. (1993) by allowing
for heterogeneous displacement e®ects between early leavers and ultimately
displaced workers. Our ¯ndings show that early leavers have signi¯cantly
better post-separation labor market prospects, both in terms of employment
probability as well as earnings, as opposed to ultimately displaced workers.
Moreover, pre-closure earnings regressions reveal that early leavers are as-
sociated with signi¯cantly higher pre-closure earnings even conditional on
several individual and plant characteristics. Ultimately, we show that dis-
placed workers belonging to the upper part of the pre-closure earnings distri-
bution are associated with signi¯cantly higher post-separation employment
probabilities.
Taken together, a picture emerges that is more in line with the \workers
leaving the sinking ship" mechanism suggesting that compositional di®er-
ences cause estimated displacement costs to be signi¯cantly lower for early
leavers as opposed to ultimately displaced workers. Focusing exclusively on
the latter group would therefore lead to a serious overestimation of displace-
ment costs.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the common de¯nition
and practice of measurement of displacement e®ects and formulates the key
propositions tested in this paper. In Section 3 we describe the data and the
sample selection. Section 4 provides descriptive evidence on pre-closure char-
acteristics and post-separation outcome variables of separators from closing
establishments. Estimation methods to test the main hypotheses and results
4are presented in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 De¯nition and Measurement of Displace-
ment E®ects
The formal de¯nition of displacement costs proposed in Jacobson et al. (1993)
is given by
E(yitjDi;s = 1;Ii;s¡p) ¡ E(yitjDi;v = 0 8 v;Ii;s¡p); (1)
where yit denotes the earnings of worker i at date t and Di;s = 1 if worker
i was displaced at date s (and Di;s = 0 otherwise). The information available
at date s¡p is given by Ii;s¡p and p is su±ciently large that the events that
eventually lead to displacement would not have begun by date s ¡ p.
The most straightforward speci¯cation of a statistical model to estimate
earnings losses corresponding to the de¯nition in equation (1), that is pre-
sented in Jacobson et al. (1993), reads as follows





it±k + ²it: (2)
This model represents workers' earnings histories (yit) and identi¯es dis-
placement costs with a subset of the model's parameters (±k). The speci-
¯cation allows the pooling of information for workers displaced at di®erent
periods, by introducing a set of dummy variables for the number of quar-
ters before and after worker's separation, Dk
it, where Dk
it = 1 if, in period t,
worker i had been displaced k quarters earlier (or, if k is negative, worker
i was displaced ¡k quarters later). Moreover, worker's earnings depend on
some controls for calendar time e®ects (°t) and individual ¯xed e®ects (®i).
Taking this model to the data involves several di±culties. First, it typi-
cally requires administrative data in order to obtain information on long-term
labor market outcomes of displaced as well as non-displaced workers. The
use of administrative data, however, normally implies the shortcoming of
having no information about the cause of an observed separation. The most
5popular strategy to overcome this problem is to focus on separations occur-
ring at the moment of displacement-generating events such as mass-layo®s or
plant closures, which can be identi¯ed in matched employer-employee data
by reductions in plant-/¯rm-level employment. To cope with the possibility
of displacements happening prior to the identi¯ed displacement generating
event, it is common practice to include all separations observed within a cer-
tain time window before the actual event. Note, therefore that this standard
speci¯cation encompasses two types of displaced workers: "early leavers"
(those who separated before the displacement generating event) and "ulti-
mately displaced workers" (those who remained employed until the bitter
end). Hence, the set of dummy variables identifying displaced workers in






it have an identical interpretation as Dk
it with the additional distinction
that UDk
it identi¯es ultimately displaced workers, while ELk
it identi¯es early
leavers.
Incorporating this de¯nition in equation (2) results in the following ex-
pression







it)±k + ²it: (3)
This paper now proposes the simple idea that displacement e®ects (±0s)
vary according to the timing of separation relative to the closure of a plant.
In particular, displacement e®ects are di®erent for early leavers and ulti-
mately displaced workers. Making this distinction is motivated by economic
theory. Given advance knowledge about the upcoming event, a search model
of the labor market implies that such knowledge lowers the value of a given
employment relationship as the probability of ending in unemployment in-
creases.8 This, in turn, lowers the worker's reservation wage and increases
a worker's search intensity. If workers are heterogeneous with respect to
their outside opportunities, then workers with better labor market prospects
might engage more intensively in on-the-job search, receive more job o®ers
8The search framework is typically used in studies examining the e®ect of advance
notice of job-displacement. See Ruhm (1994), Friesen (1997) and Bowlus and Vilhuber
(2002).
6and consequently have higher quit rates.9 On the other hand, a negative
demand shock for the ¯rm's product results in reductions in the demand
for labor. If ¯rms have discretion on whom to lay o® and private knowledge
about workers' "true" productivity, the ¯rm chooses to lay o® less productive
workers ¯rst, who are presumably associated with relatively bad labor market
prospects. In sum, both mechanisms suggest that a selection on individual
characteristics exists in the labor turnover of distressed ¯rms. Empirical
evidence presented in Pfann and Hamermesh (2001) and Lengermann and
Vilhuber (2002) supports this selection hypothesis. Consequently, displace-
ment e®ects of early leavers and ultimately displaced workers might vary due
to this selection process based on workers' characteristics.
We formulate this potential implication of selection in the turnover process
of closing plants as a testable proposition:
Proposition 1 Displacement e®ects vary according to the timing of sepa-
ration relative to the closure of a plant. In particular, workers separating





where, omitting any subscript indicating the distance to separation, ±EL and
±UD refer to the e®ect of displacement for early leavers and ultimately dis-
placed workers, respectively.
Proposition 1 states the ¯rst key hypothesis this study aims to test. How-
ever, even if observed displacement e®ects di®er between early leavers and
ultimately displaced workers, these di®erences could be due to reasons other
than selection based on workers' characteristics. While previous studies have
investigated di®erences between early leavers along various dimensions, we
limit our focus to di®erences in pre-closure earnings. Acknowledging the lim-
ited capability of earnings to proxy for workers' productivity, we nevertheless
9This study takes the point of view that any separation -whether a layo® or a quit-
should be included in the treatment group if the separation is related to the upcoming
closure. A distressed ¯rm might, for instance, enforce wage cuts. A worker, who would
have normally remained in the ¯rm, might therefore quit.
7expect earnings to be positively correlated with individual productivity.10
Hence, if selection based on productivity-related worker characteristics takes
place, we would expect to see di®erences between early leavers and ultimately
displaced workers in terms of pre-closure earnings. However, as presumably
both mechanisms, ¯rms' laying o® less productive workers and workers with
better labor market prospects quitting, are at work simultaneously, the two
channels might o®set each other in such a way that on average no di®erences
in pre-closure earnings exist.
Thus, we expect to see di®erences in average pre-closure earnings only
if one selection mechanism \dominates" the other. To test for this form of
dominance, we formulate the following testable proposition:
Proposition 2 Average pre-closure earnings of displaced workers vary ac-
cording to the timing of separation relative to the closure of a plant. In
particular, workers separating early in the closure process are associated with
di®erent levels of average pre-closure earnings compared to ultimately dis-
placed workers.
Ultimately, di®erences in average pre-earnings levels between early leavers
and ultimately displaced workers can serve only as a potential explanation for
di®erences in post-separation outcomes between these groups, if pre-closure
earnings levels are related to the e®ect of displacement. Consequently, it
remains to test whether displacement e®ects are correlated with pre-closure
earnings levels:
Proposition 3 Pre-closure earnings are correlated with the e®ect of dis-
placement. In particular, workers belonging to the upper part of the pre-
closure earnings distribution are associated with di®erent costs of displace-
ment as opposed to workers' positioned at the lower end of the distribution.
Testing the validity of the latter two propositions could shed light on the
link between selection in the labor turnover process before plant closure and
di®erences in displacement e®ects relative to plant closure.
10The standard assumption that labor earns its marginal product might be violated for
several reasons such as implicit incentive contracts or union bargaining.
83 Data Description
The data stems from the Austrian social security database (ASSD). The
data set includes the universe of private sector workers in Austria covered
by the social security system. All employment records can be linked to the
establishment in which the worker is employed. It contains detailed infor-
mation on individuals' employment and earnings histories as well as certain
individual characteristics. Daily employment and monthly earnings infor-
mation is extremely reliable, because social security tax payments for ¯rms
as well as bene¯ts for workers hinge on these data.11 Monthly earnings are
top-coded, which applies to approximately 10% of workers. We transformed
monthly gross earnings in daily wages dividing them by e®ective employment
duration in each month of observation. Furthermore, the data includes in-
formation on employers such as geographical location, industry and size of
the establishment.
The data set covers the period from 1978 until 1993 at a quarterly fre-
quency, where the 10th of February, May, August and November serve as
reference dates for the data collection. This setup implies that an individual
is recorded as employed in a given quarter only if she is employed at the
corresponding reference date. We concentrate on workers employed in the
period 1982 to 1988 - who are in the risk set for a plant closure in this period;
this allows us to observe the workers in detail 5 years prior to bankruptcy
and 5 years afterwards.
The ASSD contains no direct information on plant closures. Following
best practice in the displacement literature we identify a plant closure by
the disappearance of a plant identi¯er. Each establishment has an employer
social security number. Hence, a shutdown of an establishment in the data
occurs when the employer identi¯er ceases to exist. As the unit of analysis
is a plant as opposed to a ¯rm, the possibility remains that a disappearance
of an establishment identi¯er re°ects re-organization or takeovers. To avoid
including these \false plant deaths" we impose the following restriction: A
plant is coded as a closing plant at the reference date t if two conditions
11See Hofer and Winter-Ebmer (2003) for a description of the data set.
9are satis¯ed: (i) The plant identi¯er disappears during the three months
following the reference date t (not observed anymore at t + 1) and does not
re-emerge during the following year12. (ii) Less than 50% of the employees of
an establishment ¯nd a new employment relationship under the same, new
establishment identi¯er.13 The latter condition minimizes the inclusion of
\false plant deaths", but might eliminate also some true plant closure, where
large groups of workers move \together" from one dying ¯rm into the same
new ¯rm.14
The sample selection follows closely the one applied in Ichino et al. (2007).
The sample contains workers who ful¯ll the following conditions, at least at
one of the quarter reference dates from 1982 to 1988: (i) Workers from plants
not belonging to the construction and tourism industry. (ii) Workers from
plants that once had at least 5 workers between 1978 and 1988. (iii) Blue and
white collar workers with at least one year of tenure. (iv) Workers between
35 and 55 years of age.
The ¯rst two criteria are meant to exclude seasonal employment and
establishments without basically any dependent employees. The latter two
criteria should ensure that all workers present similar legal requirements for
layo®. Low tenure workers and older workers might be easier to layo® due
to probation periods or early retirement regulations.
The setup described above allows us to identify 4,703 closing plants be-
tween 1983 and 1988. Table 1 shows the incidence of plant closure by quarter
and year. It reveals a clear seasonal pattern of plant closures. Almost one
third of all closures occur in the last quarter of a year. The number of clo-
sures per year increases slightly during the 1980s. The distribution of plant
closures over the nine federal states of Austria is displayed in Table 2. Al-
most one third of all closures happen in Vienna, the biggest and economically
12This condition is set to one year, because the plant identi¯ers are assigned anew after
two years.
13Workers from such establishments are coded as \ambiguous" and are neither in the
treatment nor the control group.
14This might be especially relevant in the European context, because of legal require-
ments before mass-layo®s such as \social plans". In this case the displacing ¯rm might
have gone through extraordinary e®orts to secure re-employment of its workers at other
¯rms.
10most powerful province of Austria.
The upper panel of ¯gure 1 plots the total number of employees in all
plants closing between 1985 and 1988 against quarters relative to closure.15
While total employment decreases over all three years before closure, it be-
comes apparent that the number of separations increases sharply in the last
year before closure. In fact the number of employees more than halves from
28296 one year before closure to 12126 workers just before the closure. This
drastic decline suggests that some of these separations are related to the
upcoming closure of the establishments.
The bottom panel shows two examples of employment trends at the plant
level before closure. Broadly speaking we observe two types of closing estab-
lishments in the data. Type A, represented by the lower left ¯gure, shows
no or a slow decline in total employment before closure. Type B (lower
right ¯gure) is characterized by sharp stepwise downsizing in the quarters
just before closure. Especially the latter type gives reason to believe that
displacement (or closure-related separations) happens even several quarters
before the ultimate closure.
Finally, it is worth noting another point at this stage. The ¯gures on
total employment in ¯gure 1 are based on a generated variable that counts
all employees in the social security records associated with the respective
plant identi¯er. However, not all employees ful¯ll the selection criteria out-
lined above. Moreover, as the ¯nal analysis is conducted based on an exact
matching procedure (see section 5), some workers, although ful¯lling the
above criteria, could not be matched to a control and, therefore, are not
included in the empirical analysis. The dotted lines in the lower panel of
¯gure 1 indicate the number of workers included in the empirical analysis.
Notably, the number of workers included in the empirical analysis shows a
more stable pattern before closure than total employment does. This re°ects
that a signi¯cant number of separations before closure include low tenure
workers or workers not in the age group between 35 and 55.
15Note that total employment in ¯gure 1 refers only to a subset of the 4,703 closing
plants. Namely to all plants closing between 1985 and 1988 for which information on
plantsize is available for all 12 quarter before closure.
114 Descriptive Statistics on Separations be-
fore Plant Closure
It is common practice in the displacement literature to include also sepa-
rations happening within a certain time-window prior to the displacement-
generating event. While this reduces the possibility of neglecting early leavers,
it increase at the same time the chances of including a considerable amount
of normal workforce turnover. Thus, we ¯rst analyze separations happen-
ing before plant closure to detect potential patterns that might distinguish
plant-closure-related separations from normal turnover. In the following, we
therefore present various descriptive statistics for di®erent separators groups
distinguished by the timing of the separation relative to the closure of the
plant.
Figure 2 shows changes in average workforce characteristics in all closing
plants before closure. All variables are held constant at their level three years
before closure. Any variation, therefore, stems from changes in the compo-
sition of the workforce.16 The top left panel reveals that the share of female
workers remains relatively stable at around 49% during quarters 12 to 4 be-
fore closure, but increases during the last year before closure by 6 percentage
points. This indicates that early leavers are mainly men. Furthermore, early
leavers are also mainly blue collar workers, which can be seen from the top
right panel. The share of white collar workers in dying establishments jumps
up by 12 percentage points in the last year of existence. Before this period,
the share of white collars is steadily declining.
The higher share of blue-collar workers might be explained by institu-
tional factors. In particular, the legislation on advance notice varies for blue
and white collar workers in Austria. Depending on age and tenure, blue col-
lar workers receive an advance notice of displacement up to two weeks before
dismissal. White collar workers, on the other hand, receive such a notice
between 1.5 and 5 months before dismissal.17 Hence, if economic di±culties
16New hires are not included. Hence, compositional changes are solely induced by
separations.
17See OECD (1993) for an overview of employment protection legislation in several
OECD countries including Austria.
12make downsizing necessary, it is less di±cult to layo® blue-collar workers.
The middle panels show average experience and job tenure in days. Av-
erage experience rises up to the fourth quarter before closure by 30 days
re°ecting the fact that these very early separators have below average expe-
rience levels. During the last year of the plant's existence, more experienced
workers tend to leave the plant, so that average experience again declines by
20 days. Average tenure, on the other hand, increase over the entire three
year period before closure. However, while average tenure grows by around
110 days from quarter 12 to quarter 4 before closure, the increase in tenure
almost vanishes to only 6 days during the last year before closure. Recall
that tenure refers to the level three years before closure and that newly hired
worked as well as workers with less than one year of tenure are not included
in this average tenure measure. Hence, the initial increase in average tenure
is not surprising as a correlation between the probability of leaving the ¯rm
and the tenure level is economically intuitive. Models including ¯rm-speci¯c
human capital, heterogeneous job-matches or wage-seniority would imply
such a correlation.18 This makes it the more interesting to see that workers
leaving shortly before plant closure are not characterized by below average
tenure levels.
Average age is plotted in the lower left panel. It decreases slightly over
the entire pre-closure period. No di®erent pattern is apparent during the
last year before closure. Hence the observed decrease in the average work
experience and the °attening of the increase in tenure during this period is
not a mere by-product of an age-e®ect in the sense that older workers are
leaving in increasing numbers shortly before closure.
Descriptive statistics on daily earnings can be seen in the bottom right
panel. Average daily earnings in euros at their level 3 years before closure are
plotted against time relative to closure. Initially average earnings increase
slightly by 30 cents from quarter -12 to quarter -4. Thereafter, up until
closure, earnings drop by 80 cents, which roughly corresponds to a 2.5 per
cent earnings drop. This indicates that early leavers are associated with
higher average earnings compared to ultimately displaced workers.
18See Becker (1975), Jovanovic (1979) and Lazaer (1981) for examples of such models.
13In sum, the key ¯ndings of these descriptive statistics are that separators
leaving a dying establishment up to two quarters before closure are predom-
inately men and blue collar workers. Moreover, they are associated with
unconditional higher daily earnings.
To analyze the short-run e®ect of early separation we focus on the labor
market status of separators in the ¯rst quarter after leaving the closing plant.
As earnings data is available, we are able to evaluate a new employment
relationship based on the associated daily wage. That is, we classify the new
job relative to the previous job. In particular, we categorize the employment
status in the ¯rst post closure quarter according to three di®erent states: (i)
not employed, (ii) employed with a lower wage, (iii) employed with a higher
or equal wage.
One advantage of looking at the directions of separations is that it pro-
vides some evidence on the cause of separation, namely on whether the em-
ployment relationship ends because of a layo® or quit. Typically it is impos-
sible to distinguish between these two causes in non-survey data. However,
when observing individuals employed in a higher wage job immediately after
separation it seems likely that these individuals quit their previous job. On
the other hand, observing an individual accepting a lower wage or not being
employed might indicate a layo®.
Figure 3 displays the percentage of workers ending up in either of the
three states in the ¯rst quarter after separation by separation groups. First,
notice that the distribution over the 3 outcomes varies quite a bit in the
quarters -12 to -6 before closure with the results for quarter -10 being an
outlier. However, as these separations occur at least one-and-a-half years
before the closure of the plant, it is unlikely that a huge fraction of them is
related to the closure event.
Starting from quarter -6 until quarter -1 a downward trend in the per-
centage of separators not employed immediately after separation becomes
apparent. While 66 % of all separators leaving at quarter -6 end up not
being employed in the next quarter, only 44 % of the separators leaving the
distressed establishment in quarter -1 share the same fate. However, among
those who stayed until the end 59% end up in non-employment in the ¯rst
14quarter after plant closure.
Analogously, the fraction of separators immediately accepting a lower
paid job increases until quarter -1 (up to 35 %) and then drops back for
ultimately displaced workers (18 %). Interestingly, no such pattern exists for
workers ¯nding a higher paid job immediately.
This already provides some ¯rst evidence that in the short run early
leavers perform better compared to ultimately displaced workers. To inves-
tigate this aspect further, we conduct a survival analysis. Figure 4 plots
the Kaplan-Meier estimates for survival in non-employment after separation
by quarter of separation relative to plant closure.19 The graph reveals that
while there appears to be no signi¯cant di®erence in terms of search time
between ultimately displaced workers and early leavers leaving the closing
plant in quarter -4 and -3, separators in quarters -2 and -1 ¯nd new employ-
ment more quickly. 75 % of early leavers leaving at -1 manage to ¯nd a new
job within 2 quarters after separation and only 10 % of this group remain
non-employed within the ¯rst 4 years after separation. In contrast, among
the ultimately displaced workers around 30 % remain non-employed during
the ¯rst 2 quarters and still roughly 15 % during the ¯rst 4 quarters after
after closure.
To understand how overall employment probabilities change by quarter
of separation relative to plant closure, ¯gure 5 shows average employment by
separator groups in the 16 quarters before and 20 quarters after separation.
While prior to separation no signi¯cant di®erences exist, the employment
probabilities of late early leavers (d=-1 and d=-2) dominate the respective
probabilities of the other three groups in the ¯rst 20 quarters after separation.
Finally ¯gure 6 provides unconditional evidence on the evolution of nom-
inal log daily earnings, conditional on being employed, by separation groups.
Obviously, changes in this measure may occur because of changes in real earn-
ings, in in°ation and because the set of employed workers may change. The
evolution of earnings is qualitatively very similar for all separation groups.
19In light of the descriptive results presented in ¯gure 2 and ¯gure 3, which reveal
especially interesting patterns in the last year before closure, we focus henceforth on
separations happening during this period.
15Over time, nominal daily earnings increase strongly, mainly re°ecting growth
in real earnings and in°ation. Three aspects are particularly worth mention-
ing: ¯rstly, at all quarters the level of earnings is the lowest for the group of
ultimately displaced workers. However, the di®erence with any other group
is always quite small, never exceeding more than .1 log points. Secondly,
all groups have a spike in the evolution of wages directly after separation.
This clearly re°ects selectivity as the workers who are able to ¯nd a new job
immediately are probably also the more productive ones. Thirdly, no higher
earnings loss due to separation is obvious for ultimately displaced workers as
opposed to early leavers conditional on being employed.
5 Estimation and Results
Borrowed from the evaluation literature, the seminal study of Jacobson et al.
(1993) introduced the idea of studying the e®ects of displacement in a di®erence-
in-di®erence setup. This way the e®ects of an involuntary job-loss are not
identi¯ed by a simple pre/post comparison, but by the di®erence in di®er-
ences when compared to pre/post outcomes of an adequate control group.
The post outcome of the control group should conceptually serve as an esti-
mate for the counterfactual outcome that would have occurred in the absence
of displacement. To account for any remaining heterogeneity in the compo-
sition of the displaced and the non-displaced and to isolate the pure e®ect of
displacement, individual ¯xed e®ects are included in the analysis to capture
any time-invariant di®erences.
We go beyond this approach by employing an exact matching algorithm
to further increase the comparability of treated and control subjects. Se-
lection of a control group based on exact matching is feasible in this study
given the enormous size of our data set. One advantage of exact matching
is the creation of a common support for the treatment and control group.
That is, we extract from the administrative records only those controls for a
given treated, who have identical (or almost identical) characteristics. The
characteristics with which we perform exact matching are gender, age, broad
occupational status, industry and region of the employer. Moreover, we con-
16duct almost exact matching based on quartile groups on continuous variables
such as ¯rm size and average daily earnings one year prior to displacement.
Figure 7 visualizes how the matching algorithm works. Note two further
points: (i) Besides being not employed in a closing plant, a valid control has
to ful¯ll also the sample selection criteria described in section 3. (ii) The
matching is performed at the last quarter the treated was observed being
employed in the closing plant.
Identifying Early Leavers
Before turning to the estimation of displacement e®ects, we exploit this
setup by comparing post-separation outcomes of early separators from clos-
ing plants with those of separators from surviving plants. This provides a
test for the validity of including early leavers in the displacement group. The
rationale behind this exercise is that if observed separations prior to the clo-
sure of a plant were due to \normal" labor turnover, which is not related
to the upcoming plant closure, then post-separation outcomes should be in-
distinguishable from post-separation outcomes of separations happening in
non-closure plants.
Equation 4 presents an empirical model to measure di®erences in post-








it · + ®i + µt + ²it: (4)
Yit represents the outcome variable of interest, ®i is an individual-speci¯c
¯xed e®ect, µt captures the e®ect of calendar time and ²it is an error term
uncorrelated with all variables appearing on the right side of the equation.
K
1;20
it indicates the period relative to separation. For simplicity we don't
estimate a single parameter for each quarter k relative to closure, but rather
restrict our attention to the average e®ect over the ¯rst 5 years after sep-
aration. The dummy variable K
1;20
it takes the value one if the separation
happened up to 20 quarters before (0 < k · 20) and zero otherwise.
Separators from closing plants are identi¯ed by a dummy variable ~ Dd
i.
The dummy ~ Dd
i takes the value one if individual i separated from a closing
17plant. The superscript d indicates the quarter of separation relative to the
closure of the plant. We estimate equation (4) separately for all separations
happening up to 4 quarters before the plant is last observed in the data.
That is, separately for d= -1, -2, -3 and -4.
The control groups are selected based on the matching algorithm pre-
sented in ¯gure 7. For each separator from a closing plant only separators
from non-closing plants with almost identical characteristics are selected as
controls.20 The quality of this matching procedure is shown in table 3. For
all 4 pairs of treatment and control groups mean di®erences in observed char-
acteristics are extremely small. Only tenure and plantsize show somewhat
larger di®erences. However, a di®erence in average tenure of up to 200 days
is still relatively small compared to overall average values of around 2500
days and standard deviations of around 1700. While tenure is not a match-
ing variable, treated and controls have been matched based on quartiles of
the plantsize distribution. Yet, for all groups the average plantsize is con-
sistently higher for separators from closing plants as compared to separators
from non-closing plants. However, should the on average larger plantsize in
the control groups signi¯cantly worsen the comparability between separators
from closing plants and separators from non-closing plants, then at least it
seems plausible to assume that this would in°uence results for all 4 groups
more or less equally. Moreover, equation (4) includes additionally individ-
ual ¯xed e®ects to capture any remaining time-invariant di®erences between
separators from closing plants and separators from non-closing plants.
Table 4 presents the results from estimating equation (4). The upper
panel of table 4 shows estimation results with an employment dummy as
dependent variable, while the lower panel shows estimation results with log
daily earnings conditional on employment as the outcome variable. Control-
ling for individual ¯xed e®ects and calendar time e®ects, row 2 of table 4
reveals negative separation e®ects in terms of employment probabilities for
20If downsizing occurs also in non-closing plants and selective labor turnover matters
for the survival probability of a plant, then including these separators in the control group
might bias the results. However, our main results of this exercise remain qualitatively
unchanged when restricting potential controls to include only separators from non-closing
plants with quarter-on-quarter employment reductions of no greater than 30%.
18all four groups. Estimated separation e®ects range from -.37 to -.42 indicat-
ing a common loss in terms of employment probabilities in the ¯rst 5 years
after separation of around 40 percentage points.
The estimated interaction e®ect K1;20 ~ Dd can be seen in row 1 of table 4.
The results reveal a signi¯cant e®ect of separating from a closure plant that
goes beyond the isolated e®ect of separation for early leavers separating in
d equal to -1 or -2. While separators leaving closing plants 3 and 4 quarters
before closure are indistinguishable from normal separations, the estimated
coe±cients indicate a reduced loss in terms of employment probabilities for
early leavers separating 1 or 2 quarters before closure of 9.4 and 7.2 percent-
age points, respectively. In terms of daily earnings no signi¯cant di®erences
between separators from closing and non-closing plants can be found.
The results of this exercise provide evidence that at least a high frac-
tion of all separations happening during the closure process of a plant are
directly related to the upcoming closure and, therefore, should be included
in the treatment group in the analysis of displacement e®ects. Given the
results presented above, we feel con¯dent in including at least all separations
happening up to two quarters before closure into the displacement group.
Displacement Costs and Time of Separation
We can now de¯ne more speci¯cally a dummy variable identifying early
leavers. Let ELi take the value one if individual i is observed working in
a closing plant in the two last quarters before the plant closes (¡2 · d < 0,
but who is not employed at the plant at the very last quarter (d = 0) the
plant is observed in the data and takes the value zero otherwise. Analogously
we (re-)de¯ne the dummy variable Di to identify all workers separating due
to a plant closure. This includes the above de¯ned group of early leavers as
well as ultimately displaced workers.
With this notation in mind we are now able to test Proposition 1. Equa-
tion (5) de¯nes a model to measure the e®ects of displacement that allows
for heterogeneous displacement e®ects:
19Yit = K
1;20
it · + K
1;20
it Di± + K
1;20
it DiELi° + K
1;20
it ELi» + ®i + µt + ²it: (5)
We again measure these e®ects separately for employment probabilities
and earnings. Yit denotes the outcome variable of interest. As before, ®i
is an individual-speci¯c ¯xed e®ect, µt captures the e®ect of calendar time,
K
1;20
it identi¯es the 5 years time period after separation and ²it is an error
term uncorrelated with all right-hand-side variables.
Equation (5) extends the model de¯ned in equation (4) by the two in-
teraction e®ects K
1;20
it DiELi and K
1;20
it ELi. The latter e®ect is supposed to
capture any systematic di®erence between early leavers and their matched
controls that goes beyond the isolated e®ect of K
1;20
it . The coe±cient °, that
is associated with the interaction e®ect K
1;20
it DiELi, is our key parameter
interest. It measures the additional e®ect of being an early leaver that goes
beyond the common e®ect of displacement ±.
Note, there's another important di®erence in the estimation of equation
(5) in comparison to equation (4). The control group consists now of any
matched controls, who are employed at a non-closure plant at the last quarter
the corresponding treated was last observed working for the closing plant.
This does not restrict future employment patterns of the control group in any
way. Neither does it restrict the control to separate within the next quarter
as well (as it did in the comparison with normal turnover presented above),
nor does it restrict a control to a continuously employed worker as is the
case in many displacement studies.21 In this study we take the point of view
that an adequate control should not be restricted in any way to proxy for the
counterfactual outcome in the absence of displacement. A control should be
distinguishable from a treated only insofar that the control does not su®er
from displacement due to a plant closure. A control might, however, lose the
job due to other reasons.
As before, the selection of adequate controls is based on the exact match-
ing algorithm presented in ¯gure 7. Table 5 presents evidence on the quality
of the matching. Again the matching procedure worked well. Di®erences in
21See for example Jacobson et al. (1993).
20means between displaced and non-displaced workers are small, with somehow
larger di®erences in tenure and plantsize.
Displaced early leavers are associated with on average 228 days of tenure
less than their matched controls. This di®erence is, however, only about
0.13 standard deviations. Moreover, if tenure is associated with more stable
employment and higher earnings, the worse matching for early leavers in
terms of tenure should (if at all) downward-bias the e®ect of displacement
for early leavers as opposed to ultimately displaced workers.
Moreover, displaced workers are on average employed in smaller plants
compared to their matched control subjects. The matching procedure based
on quartiles did not work too well here. However, one should keep in mind
that our estimation strategy does not solely rely on selecting adequate con-
trols based on matching certain characteristics, but additionally includes
individual ¯xed e®ects to capture remaining time-invariant confounding fac-
tors. Hence, it seems very unlikely that this di®erence in average plantsize
between early leavers and their matched controls could ultimately drive our
results.
Table 5 also reveals di®erences between early leavers and ultimately dis-
placed workers. As already seen in the descriptive statistics, the group of
early leavers consists more of men and blue collar workers compared to the
group of ultimately displaced workers. Moreover, while both groups of dis-
placed workers were employed at the same closing plants, the early leavers
stem to a signi¯cantly larger proportion from big establishments. However,
part of the di®erence in plantsize is precisely due to the downsizing before
closure as plantsize is measured at the moment of separation.
Table 6 presents the results of estimating equation (5). Column 1 shows
estimated coe±cients from a regression with an employment dummy as de-
pendent variable. The estimate for ±, which can be seen in row 4, reveals that
the overall e®ect of displacement in terms of employment probability is es-
timated to be -0.23, implying a reduction in post-displacement employment
probability of 23 percentage points in the ¯rst 5 years after displacement.
This e®ect goes beyond the pure time e®ect K1;20 of -.07, which represents
the dissolution of employment relationships present even in the absence of
21displacement. While no systematic di®erences can be found between early
leavers and their matched controls, the additional e®ect of leaving early is
estimated to be highly signi¯cant at around 0.07. This implies that early
leavers face a 7 percentage points higher employment probability as opposed
to ultimately displaced workers.
Column 2 presents analogous di®erence-in-di®erence estimation results
with log daily earnings (conditional on being employed) as dependent vari-
able. Focusing on the key parameters of interest in column 2, we ¯nd a
common earnings loss due to displacement of 6 percent, but a signi¯cant 1.2
percentage points lower loss for early leavers. Column 3 shows earnings re-
sults with a less restrictive sample selection. Similar to the selection criteria
applied in other studies, we assign zero earnings for individuals not employed
in a given quarter, but include only observations with positive earnings within
a calendar year. Hence, this \unconditional" earnings measure captures also
earnings losses through short-term non-employment, which increases the es-
timated common loss of displacement to 61 percent. The loss for early leavers
is now 14 percentage points lower.
In sum, table 2 reveals that the cost of displacement is signi¯cantly lower
for early leavers compared to ultimately displaced workers. The di®erence
in displacement e®ects might be explained by compositional di®erences be-
tween these two groups. Section 4 already provided descriptive evidence on
di®erences in average workers characteristics, which fosters the conjecture
that a selection process has set in during the closure procedure. Moreover,
previous studies have also found evidence for the presence of selection in the
labor turnover process before plant closure.22
However, workers and management have a competing agenda. Highly
productive workers might leave a distressed plant to avoid ultimate displace-
ment, whereas low productivity workers might be the ¯rst to be laid-o® when
a negative demand shock makes downsizing necessary. Hence, it remains an
empirical challenge to answer how average productivity varies between early
leavers and ultimately displaced workers.
22See Lengermann and Vilhuber (2002) and Pfann and Hamermesh (2001).
22Pre-Closure Earnings and Time of Separation
To test proposition 2 we estimate a model of pre-separation daily earnings.
However, note two important caveats of interpreting observed earnings di®er-
entials as di®erences in productivity: First, the use of earnings as a measure
of worker productivity is based on the underlying assumption that wages are
equal to the marginal products of labor. Various characteristics of actual
labor markets, such as discrimination, union bargaining, signalling and mis-
match, may result in violations of this assumption. Secondly, our measure
of daily earnings does not re°ect di®erences in labor input in terms of hours
worked. Nevertheless, earnings remain the best available proxy for a worker's
productivity given the data in hand.
Equation (6) presents a model of pre-separation earnings,
ln(wit) = ELi¸ + X
0
it¯ + µt + ²it; (6)
where the dependent variable ln(wit) represents log daily earnings, ELi takes
the value one if individual i is an early leaver and takes the value zero if
individual i is an ultimately displaced worker, Xit a set of control variables,
µt captures the e®ect of calendar time and ²it is an error term uncorrelated
with all right-hand-side variables.
Table 7 presents the results of estimating equation (6). All regressions
control for calendar time e®ects as well as for relative distance to the closure
of the plant. The latter variable is an important control as earnings might
be contaminated due to the economic ill-being of the employer. Column 1
represents the results from regressing log daily earnings on the early leaver
dummy. The estimated coe±cient ¸ is negative at -0.05 and highly signi¯-
cant. This unconditional evidence suggests that early leavers are associated
with 5% lower daily earnings in the 17 quarters before displacement. Includ-
ing personal characteristics such as age, gender, broad occupation and tenure
pushes up the estimate to 0.72.23
Including plant characteristics such as plantsize, industry and location of
23The estimated earnings di®erential between men and women of -0.56 in column 2 most
likely re°ects the typical higher share of part-time work among women.
23the plant drives down the estimated coe±cient for early leavers again, as can
be seen in column 3. However, the estimate remains signi¯cant and positive
at 0.41. Finally, estimating a Tobit speci¯cation accounting for top-coding
in the earnings data does not change the results signi¯cantly.
In sum, all speci¯cations reveal signi¯cantly higher pre-closure earnings
levels for early leavers. We take this as evidence that proposition 2 is correct.
Displacement Costs and Pre-Closure Earnings
To understand how higher average pre-closure earnings a®ects displacement
e®ects, we estimate a displacement e®ect model allowing for heterogeneous
displacement e®ects along the pre-separation earnings distribution. For sim-
plicity we focus on quartile groups. That is, we allow for di®erent displace-
ment e®ects for each quartile. The model is speci¯ed as follows:
Yit = K
1;20








q + ®i + µt + ²it: (7)




it DiQrt(q)iÁq, where Qrt(q)i is a dummy variable taking the value
one if individual i belongs to the qth quartile of the pre-separation earnings
distribution and the parameter Áq measures the additional displacement ef-
fect for individuals belonging to the qth quartile relative to the baseline e®ect
of the omitted category represented by the 4th quartile of the pre-separation
earnings distribution.
To understand how these distributional di®erences a®ect the estimation
results of equation (7), we estimate equation (7) separately for early leavers,
ultimately displaced workers and the two groups jointly. Table 8 presents
the estimation results separately for employment (column 1-3) and earnings
conditional on being employed (columns 4-6).
In terms of employment probabilities, signi¯cant losses exist for the base-
line category of workers belonging to the highest quartile of the pre-separation
earnings distribution. This can be seen in row 1. The estimates ran0ge from
24-.11 for the early leavers sample up to -.19 for the ultimately displaced work-
ers sample. Based on the combined sample, high earnings workers are esti-
mated to face a reduction of 16 percentage points in their post-separation
employment probabilities. The interaction terms reveal that displacement
costs are signi¯cantly higher in terms of future employment for low earnings
workers. The workers belonging to the lowest quartile of the pre-separation
earnings distribution su®er the most. They face an additional reduction in
employment probabilities of 11 percentage points. Workers in the second
quartile also endure an additional loss of 5 percentage points compared to
high earnings workers. Workers in the third quartile su®er no signi¯cant ad-
ditional loss. Note that the pattern of displacement e®ects between quartiles
is very similar when estimating equation 7 based on the early leavers and the
ultimately displaced workers sub-samples separately.
While these results clearly suggest that above median earnings workers
su®er signi¯cantly less in terms of future employment, the results on earnings
in column 4 to 6 show a reversed pattern. Here, it appears that high earn-
ings workers lose the most as can be seen from the positive and signi¯cant
coe±cients in column 4. This pattern is also con¯rmed in the sub-sample
regressions shown in column 3 and 6.
However, while these results seem striking, they have to be interpreted
carefully. Recall that the estimations on log daily earnings only include obser-
vations with positive earnings. Hence, only those separators that successfully
found new employment after their separation are included. This, however,
leads to compositional di®erences within groups. In particular, these results
seem to suggest that those workers who are successful in ¯nding a new job are
also the more productive workers. As low pre-separation-earnings workers are
associated with signi¯cantly lower employment probabilities as opposed to
high pre-separation-earnings workers, the results are not clear-cut as di®er-
ences in post-separation earnings might be entirely driven by selection within
these groups. Moreover, the Austrian labor market is highly regulated and
wage setting is not at all °exible. This is particularly true at the lower end of
the wage distribution, where generous social security regulations implicitly
constitute minimum wages. Hence, it is not surprising that conditional on
25re-employment earnings losses basically don't occur at the lower end of the
pre-closure earnings distribution.
Results in column 7 to 9 report earnings losses on an \unconditional"
earnings measure. As this measure captures earnings losses caused by short-
term non-employment, most interaction e®ects with quartile groups become
smaller and insigni¯cant.24 This reveals that results on earnings losses caused
by a job loss strongly depend on the underlying earnings measure.
Regarding proposition 3, we therefore conclude, that - while no conclusive
evidence based on earnings exists - displacement costs in terms of employment
probabilities vary clearly with the level of pre-closure earnings. In particular,
the ¯ndings suggest that workers with above median pre-closure earnings
are associated with signi¯cantly lower losses in terms of future employment
probabilities as opposed to below median workers.
6 Conclusion
In this paper our ¯rst task was to analyze job separations happening be-
fore plant closure. We ¯nd that early leavers separating up to two quarters
before plant closure, are associated with signi¯cantly better post-separation
labor market outcomes as opposed to separators from non-closing plants.
Earlier separations from closing plants are, however, indistinguishable from
normal turnover. This ¯nding is particularly important for the economic lit-
erature that utilizes plant closures to identify involuntary and exogenous job
losses in administrative data. As plant closures usually do not happen with-
out prior notice, management and workers adjust their expectations about
the value of a given employment relationship in response to the arrival of
such information. Hence a negative shock that ultimately leads to closure
might cause separations from dying plants even before the ultimate shut-
down. While the empirical literature has acknowledged this by focusing on
all separations within a certain time window prior to plant closure, the choice
of that window often appears to be quite arbitrary. Facing the tradeo® be-
24With the exception of the interaction e®ects of the second quartile in the early leavers
sample and the third quartile in the joint sample.
26tween neglecting early leavers and including a signi¯cant amount of normal
workforce turnover, the comparison with separators from surviving plants in
terms of post-separation outcomes provides a good guideline for choosing a
particular time window. Our results suggest that at least all separations up
to 2 quarters before closure should be included in the treatment group of
displaced workers.
Given this identi¯cation of early leavers, we tested three propositions re-
lated to the selection hypothesis in the labor turnover process before plant
closure. A clear picture emerged: early leavers su®er signi¯cantly less from
separating from a closing plant compared to ultimately displaced workers.
They su®er less especially in terms of future employment probabilities. More-
over, early leavers are associated with signi¯cantly higher pre-closure earn-
ings levels conditional on several individual and ¯rm characteristics. Finally,
displacement costs (in terms of future employment probabilities) are signi¯-
cantly lower for workers with higher pre-closure earnings.
These ¯ndings are in line with the hypothesis that prior knowledge about
the upcoming plant closure induces both management and workers to re-
act in terms of their ¯ring and quitting decisions. As a consequence, selec-
tion based on workers' characteristics occurs: ¯rms laying o® less productive
workers, while workers with better outside options quit. However, on average
early leavers appear to be more productive as suggested by higher average
pre-closure earnings. As displacement costs in terms of future employment
are lower for high-earnings workers, the observed di®erence in displacement
e®ects between early leavers and ultimately displaced workers could be ex-
plained by compositional di®erences between these groups that result from
a selection in the turnover process before plant closure.
We believe that these results are relevant for the literature on worker
displacement. A key implication of these ¯ndings is that any study utilizing
plant closures as a quasi-experiment is well advised to include also separations
occurring before the ultimate shutdown. We propose a procedure to identify
early leavers based on a comparison with normal turnover that goes beyond
the standard, ad-hoc method of including all separations happening within a
certain time-window before closure. According to our results, focusing solely
27on ultimately displaced workers would lead to serious overestimation of the
cost of displacement as it appears that those who left before the closure are on
average the more productive workers. While this study takes the plant closure
as a given, this result also raises the question of causality and emphasizes
the importance of a better understanding of the causal link between worker
°ows and the closure of ¯rms.
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31Appendix
Table 1: Plant closures per quarter between 1983 and 1988
Year of Quarter of plant closure
plant closure 1 2 3 4 Total
1983 167 184 151 243 745
1984 174 188 145 224 731
1985 151 184 182 246 763
1986 199 185 178 251 813
1987 176 197 176 294 843
1988 175 182 166 285 808
Total 1,042 1,120 998 1,543 4,703
Table 2: Plant closures by federal state and year
Region Year of plant closure
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 Total
Wien 250 236 253 258 276 255 1,528
Niederoestereich 144 125 146 119 155 152 841
Burgenland 21 14 14 17 19 19 104
Oberoesterreich 98 92 83 117 102 108 600
Steiermark 60 79 81 81 76 70 447
Kaernten 41 39 32 53 48 38 251
Salzburg 43 53 55 52 62 55 320
Tirol 56 54 65 71 55 57 358
Vorarlberg 29 23 26 37 30 35 180
Total 742 715 755 805 823 789 4,629
Note: For 74 establishments no information on the location is available.
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Note: The upper panel shows total employment in all plants closing between 1985 and
1988 relative to closure. The lower panel shows employment and the number of
employees ful¯lling the selection criteria before closure in two representative plants.
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34Figure 3: Employment Status in the 1st quarter after separation by quarter
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38Table 3: Matching quality 1: Weighted averages for separators from closing
and non-closing plants by distance to closure
d = ¡1 d = ¡2 d = ¡3 d = ¡4
Separation from PC NPC PC NPC PC NPC PC NPC
Female .39 .39 .41 .41 .42 .42 .37 .37
Blue Collar .57 .57 .7 .7 .41 .41 .43 .43
Age (years) 43 43 44 44 44 44 43 43
Tenure (days) 2780 2459 2755 2465 2354 2530 2654 2452
Experience (days) 4532 4337 4371 4230 4233 4202 4168 4124
Daily Earnings (euro) 37 36 33 33 38 37 39 38
Plantsize 64 143 110 160 56 94 103 150
Note: Sample averages of pre-separation characteristics for separations from closing (PC)
and non-closing (NPC) plants and by distance to closure (d) in quarters. All variables
are measured at the quarter immediately before separation. Earnings are are in nominal
terms.
39Table 4: Comparison with \normal" Turnover
Employment
d = ¡1 d = ¡2 d = ¡3 d = ¡4
K1;20 ~ Dd .094 .072 .048 .014
(.017)¤¤ (.022)¤¤ (.031) (.03)
K1;20 -.38 -.403 -.418 -.374
(.013)¤¤ (.017)¤¤ (.024)¤¤ (.023)¤¤
Time dummies yes yes yes yes
Fixed e®ects yes yes yes yes
Const. .953 .897 .928 1.009
(.025)¤¤ (.029)¤¤ (.14)¤¤ (.064)¤¤
Obs. 75237 48763 24924 25296
R2 .481 .498 .511 .515
F statistic 103.694 78.143 36.133 39.15
Daily Earnings
d = ¡1 d = ¡2 d = ¡3 d = ¡4
K1;20 ~ Dd -.001 .017 .008 -.014
(.012) (.017) (.024) (.022)
K1;20 -.031 -.067 -.051 -.056
(.01)¤¤ (.013)¤¤ (.02)¤¤ (.018)¤¤
Time dummies yes yes yes yes
Fixed e®ects yes yes yes yes
Const. 5.863 5.827 5.73 5.922
(.015)¤¤ (.016)¤¤ (.065)¤¤ (.04)¤¤
Obs. 55377 34117 18153 18347
R2 .896 .896 .889 .901
F statistic 126.435 80.265 40.429 56.463
Note: Dependent variable is employment in the top panel and log daily earnings
conditional on employment in the bottom panel. K1;20 is an identi¯er for the ¯rst 20
quarters after separation and ~ Dd is a dummy that identi¯es separations from a closing
plant. Regressions are run separately for di®erent groups of separations distinguished by
the relative distance to plant closure (d). All regressions control for individual ¯xed
e®ects and for calendar time e®ects. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
40Table 5: Matching quality 2: Weighted averages by displacement status and
distance to closure
ultimately displaced early leavers
displ non-displ displ non-displ
Female .53 .53 .4 .4
Blue Collar .4 .4 .68 .68
Age (years) 44 44 44 44
(5.7) (5.7) (5.8) (5.8)
Tenure (days) 2916 2900 2876 3104
(1755) (1701) (1726) (1671)
Experience (days) 4420 4402 4423 4430
(1178) (1180) (1065) (1070)
Daily Earnings (euro) 34 34 35 35
(16) (16) (14) (14)
Plantsize 21 37 116 200
(42) (98) (148) (260)
Note: Sample averages of pre-separation characteristics, by displacement status and by
distance to closure. All variables are measured at the quarter immediately before
separation. Earnings are in nominal terms. Standard deviations in parentheses.






K1;20*D*EL .071 .012 .139
(.006)¤¤ (.005)¤ (.019)¤¤
K1;20*D -.228 -.06 -.614
(.004)¤¤ (.004)¤¤ (.013)¤¤
K1;20*EL -.001 -.015 -.00007
(.002) (.001)¤¤ (.006)
K1;20 -.068 .012 .792
(.002)¤¤ (.001)¤¤ (.008)¤¤
Time dummies yes yes yes
Fixed e®ects yes yes yes
Const. .984 5.73 6.302
(.022)¤¤ (.013)¤¤ (.052)¤¤
Obs. 6540163 5740536 6124850
R2 .459 .914 .177
F statistic 1107.077 4678.701 2535.624
Note: Dependent variable is an employment dummy in column 1 and log daily earnings
in columns 2 and 3. Results in column 2 are based on observations with positive earnings
within a quarter, while in column 3 all observations with positive earnings within a
calendar year are included. EL is a dummy variable identifying early leavers, K1;20 is an
identi¯er for the ¯rst 20 quarters after separation and D is a displacement dummy. All
regressions control for calendar time and individual ¯xed e®ects. Robust standard errors
in parentheses.
42Table 7: Pre Closure Earnings
OLS OLS OLS Tobit
(1) (2) (3) (4)
EL .049 .072 .041 .042
(.007)¤¤ (.005)¤¤ (.005)¤¤ (.001)¤¤
Age -.0002 -.0008 -.0007
(.0005) (.0004)¤ (.0001)¤¤
Female dummy -.561 -.5 -.517
(.006)¤¤ (.006)¤¤ (.002)¤¤
Tenure .00004 .00004 .00004
(1.62e-06)¤¤ (1.56e-06)¤¤ (4.48e-07)¤¤
White collar .326 .348 .373
(.006)¤¤ (.006)¤¤ (.002)¤¤
Plant size .00004 .00004
(1.00e-05)¤¤ (1.92e-06)¤¤
Industry dummies no no yes yes
Location dummies no no yes yes
Distance to closure yes yes yes yes
Time dummies yes yes yes yes
Const. 5.488 5.589 5.579 5.603
(.051)¤¤ (.042)¤¤ (.056)¤¤ (.042)¤¤
Obs. 264881 263436 263436 263436
R2 .033 .482 .533
F statistic 98.685 418.997 312.409
Note: Dependent variable is always log daily earnings. EL is a dummy variable
identifying early leavers. All regressions control for calendar time e®ects as well as for
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